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This paper investigates social  democracy and the „developmental state‟ model as development 
alternatives for South Africa. This research is significant as it enhances the developmental debate 
in South Africa that is indispensable in light of South Africa‟s poor socio-economic performance. 
A comparative-historical study is conducted, as well as an analysis of the socio-political situation in 
South  Africa  to  determine  each  model‟s  compatibility  with  South  Africa.  State  autonomy  is 
assumed  essential.  Liberal  democracy  and  the  authoritarian  „developmental  state‟  model  are 
rejected on theoretical and compatibility grounds. Social democracy is therefore investigated. It is 
concluded that this model is theoretically stronger, yet ideologically squeezed, and its execution is 
hindered by major stumbling blocks that are identified. Ultimately, it is shown that the economics 
is fairly simple, but the “primacy of politics” is essential.  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
SOUTH AFRICA‟S SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRESS since the political transition in 
1994  has  been  less  than  stellar.  South  Africa  still  faces  tremendous  socio-economic 
challenges  such  as  crippling  unemployment,  severe  poverty  and  inequality  and 
unacceptably low standards of education (Turok, 2007: 1). Economic growth has too 
been disappointing and savings rates are low. The need for improvement is becoming 
increasingly urgent, and debate has arisen on whether the African National Congress‟ 
(ANC) pursued path of neo-liberal, pro-market economic reforms, which culminated in 
the macroeconomic policy framework named Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) in 1996 is leading South Africa on a successful and sustainable path of growth 
and development, or if, as many on the Left have criticized, it is hindering development 
and merely causing greater poverty and „jobless growth‟ (Southhall and Webster, 2010: 
142).  
After a resurgence in popularity, it has become fashionable in the highest official policy 
circles in the last few years to proclaim that the „developmental state‟ is the answer to 
South Africa‟s socio-economic woes (Fine, 2010: 196). This has come about as a result of, 
inter alia, the unprecedented economic growth experienced by Japan and the so-called 
East Asian „Tigers‟ (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), the archetypes of 
the developmental state paradigm (Turok, 2007: 1). South Africa‟s departure from the 
Reconstruction  and  Development  Programme  (RDP)  to  GEAR,  and  GEAR‟s 
subsequent  failure  to  deliver  on  its  growth  and  employment  mandate,  have  also 
heightened interest in the developmental state model. It has been hailed by some as a 
panacea for South Africa‟s economic, social and institutional troubles. The South African 
                                                           




government has in fact explicitly committed itself to being a developmental state, making 
it one of the few governments in the world to do so (Edigheji, 2010: 2).   
The  global  financial  crisis  that  culminated  in  July  2009  reinforced  the  notion  that 
markets are often not self regulating and gave credence to arguments that advocate state 
interventionism (Edigheji, 2010: 1). The orthodox „efficient market hypothesis‟ has been 
undermined  and  this  has  contributed  to  renewed  interest  in  the  role  of  the  state  in 
development.  According  to  Przeworski  and  Limongi  (1993:  65),  state  autonomy  is  a 
prerequisite for economic success. This paper assumes this from the onset for reasons 
that will be elaborated on in the next section. Authoritarianism and democracy form two 
metaphorical branches of the state autonomy tree. The general types of developmental 
state  models  that  have  been  suggested  for  South  Africa  have  predominantly  been 
formulated  to  operate  within  a  democratic  political  structure.  However,  the  political 
structure  synonymous  with  the  developmental  state  as  promoted  by  the  East  Asian 
countries is relative authoritarianism. An exploration of the literature revealed that the 
„type‟  of  developmental  state  being  proposed  for  South  Africa  is  a  democratic 
developmental state that is concerned with both economic growth and social progress. 
Much inspiration for this envisioned model is being drawn from the East Asian model, 
but in fact, this research finds that the proposed South African democratic developmental 
state model seems to be, in essence, more likened to the social democratic model. Yet, 
due  to  ideological  and  contextual  constraints,  the  European,  and  specifically  the 
Scandinavian social democratic model, has been sidelined as a model of comparison and 
as a framework within which to place South Africa‟s development strategy. This paper 
argues that the development debate in South Africa has underexplored this model as a 
viable  and  desirable  developmental  model  for  South  Africa,  despite  its  theoretical 
strength and higher degree of compatibility with South Africa than the East Asian model. 
As South Africa is by constitutional definition, a democracy, it seems logical that social 
democracy be explored to better enhance this developmental debate.  
Essentially, this paper sets out to advance and broaden the developmental debate in 
South Africa and to explore how important the socio-political structure is within which 
certain economic models of development exist. There seems also to be a lack of literature 
exploring the fundamental socio-political aspects of the developmental state model and 
social democracy. The paper begins with a brief overview of the general international 
development debate that is dominated by two very broad schools of thought, i.e. the 
orthodox,  neo-liberal,  or  liberal  democratic  camp  and  the  state  interventionist  camp, 
including  such  models  as  the  developmental  state  and  social  democracy.  After  this 
concise discussion, liberal democracy and the developmental state are both dismissed as 
viable  development  models  for  South  Africa.  The  bulk  of  this  paper  then  turns  to 
examining social democracy. The characteristics of the model are highlighted, followed by 
an  analysis  of  the  socio-political  and  economic  conditions  in  South  Africa  to  gauge 
whether  this  model  could  be  a  feasible  development  option  for  South  Africa.  The 
research  aims  to  identify  any  major  challenges  that  appear  that  would  hinder  the 
implementation of social democracy in South Africa. 
Ultimately, this research forms part of a broader endeavour to find solutions or a path 
towards attaining the solutions to mitigating and eventually eliminating South Africa‟s 
crippling socio-economic problems such as high unemployment, low economic growth 
and  widening  inequality.  This  debate  is  of  vital  importance  to  contemporary  South 
African policy makers as South Africa‟s aforementioned problems affect the lives of every 3 
 
South African citizen. Besides a deep concern for South Africa‟s development, research 
on this topic is imperative in light of globalisation and the changing global economic and 
political climate whereby financial crises are becoming all too familiar and the cracks of 
current orthodox systems are widening and becoming irreparable. What this particular 
research project highlights is that it clear that the question of development is ultimately a 
political dilemma, rather than purely an economic one. The economics is relatively simple 
when the correct institutions and people are in place, so long as those implementing the 
economic policies will act in the national interest. But yet again, this is a political question. 
This paper aims to show that the “primacy of politics” is essential (Platzeck et al., 2007: 
1). Economists and economic policy makers alike must take cognisance of the greater 
socio-political context in which economic policy frameworks exist in order to implement 
economic policies that will lead to the successful development of South Africa. The paper 
concludes  that  whilst  social  democracy  cannot  be  implemented  as  a  one-size-fits-all 
approach, it is a useful framework within which to place South Africa‟s development 
strategy, and therefore deserves greater attention as a useful model for comparison. This 
is because it exemplifies, inter alia, the importance of what this paper finds to be the key 
ingredient  to unleashing developmental  possibilities,  i.e.  a  class  compromise,  or what 
Erwin  calls  a  cross-  class  alliance.  It  is  shown  that  whilst  this  seems  necessary,  the 
implementation of such a compromise is severely hindered by major ideological, socio-
political  and  institutional  stumbling  blocks  in  South  Africa.  Further  research  on  the 
possibility of a cross- class alliance that benefits all parties is required. 
2.  THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
 
As  mentioned,  the  South  African  development  debate  is  essentially  framed  within  a 
broader international debate where two competing economic visions exist: the first is 
founded  on  neoclassical  economic  orthodoxy  encompassing  neo-liberalism,  liberal 
democracy or what Dore (2000 in Fryer, 2009b: 17) calls “Anglo Saxon capitalism”, as 
spearheaded by the United States of America; and the second includes those models that 
do  not  surrender  all  to  the  whims  of  the  market,  and  involve  high  degrees  of  state 
autonomy, such as the East Asian developmental state model, Keynesianism and social 
democracy (the exemplar of which is Scandinavia). Of course there is a spectrum of 
models  that  exist,  but  generally  they  exist  within  the  broader  debate  identified  here. 
Therefore, it is these two visions alone that will inform this analysis. The latter category 
takes greater cognisance of the fallibility of markets in the absence of regulation and 
corrects for market failures to achieve socially efficient outcomes. As mentioned, the 
necessity of the state is assumed essential in this paper. The following paragraph provides 
the reasoning behind this assumption.   
Evans (2010: 44) says that a lesson that was learnt from the 20th century developmental 
states was that the state has to be one of the “institutional keystones” needed to bring 
about  economic  success.  This  is  becoming  clearer,  as  the  idea  that  globalisation  and 
neoliberal  policies  are  beneficial  to  the  development  of  developing  countries,  is  not 
supported by the evidence any more. In fact, the evidence spawned from the recent 
global  economic  crisis  suggests  quite  the  contrary,  i.e.  that  unregulated  markets  are 
“unworkable and unsustainable in the long run” (Edigheji, 2010: 1), and an increased role 
of the state is essential. There seems to be a realisation by governments worldwide that 4 
 
state  interventions  to  drive  development  are  vital  for  “well-being  and  even  for  the 
sustenance of market economies” (Edigheji, 2010: 16). Before the crisis, and particularly 
before GEAR, the ANC and the government realised this, and that in order to eradicate 
poverty and inequality, a state with the capacity to intervene would be required (Edegheji, 
2010: 1). Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 65) explain that in the presence of incomplete 
markets and imperfect information, the economy can only function if the state is there to 
insure investors, firms and depositors. The importance of the state is also explained by 
Huang (2002: 538). Huang (2002: 540) argues that state intervention is indispensable to 
solving what he calls Coordination Failure One (CF 1) and Coordination Failure 2 (CF 2) 
problems. CF1 problems are market failures that cause, for example, investments to be 
lower than the socially optimal level (Huang, 2002: 540). The state therefore needs to 
implement CF 1 policies to counteract these failures, such as governmental actions that 
restrict  domestic  markets  to  domestic  firms  or  that  socialize  investment  risks  “by 
undertaking public investments” (Huang, 2002: 547). However, CF 1 policies create rents 
and may give rise to CF 2 problems. CF 2 problems occur when governments and/or 
firms fail to coordinate their activities, causing for example, excessive entry into targeted 
industries (Huang, 2002: 540). It is essentially a political failure. CF 2 policies are then 
required,  i.e.  state-  imposed  market  restrictions.  These  will  only  be  functional  if  the 
correct state institutions are in place. This does however require governments to have the 
necessary political and intellectual capacity (Huang, 2002: 547). The state is key but it 
needs to function correctly in a coordinated, skilled and strategic way. It needs to be 
autonomous, and should not succumb to special interests. The importance of an efficient 
and coordinated institutional architecture will be elaborated on to come. 
It is therefore assumed for these reasons (and others beyond the scope of this paper), 
that state autonomy is necessary. Furthermore, the nature of this autonomy is crucial. The 
models  under  consideration  in  the  second  category  (state  autonomy),  i.e.  the 
„developmental  state‟  and  social  democracy,  have  significantly  different  autonomous 
political structures, namely relative authoritarianism and democracy respectfully. Before 
we compare these two structures, it seems more sensible to return to the first category 
(orthodox neoclassical models), and flesh out the liberal democratic model to start. 
 
a. Liberal Democracy 
 
In  the  1980s,  the  libertarians  and  neo-liberals  brought  about  a  return  to  “rugged 
individualism,  deregulation,  and  privatization  of  social  protection”  (Esping-Andersen, 
2002: 4). Markets were able to reign freely. Besides perhaps the debatable exceptions of 
New  Zealand,  Britain  and  the  USA,  accomplishments  of  neo-liberalism  have  been 
limited, even where “their ideology was vocally embraced” (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 4). 
This is in large part due to the fact that neoclassical economics has little regard for equity, 
and even views it as a “drag on growth” (Edigheji, 2002: 11). Whilst the strength of liberal 
democracy is its promotion of efficiency though market clearing, its lack of focus on 
social justice cements its downfall (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 7). In most European states, 
there exists an unfailing “dedication to basic social citizenship, to pooling social risks 
collectively”  (Esping-Andersen,  2002:  7).  There  is  an  absence  of  a  collective  social 
responsibility in the liberal democratic model. The inherent flaws in liberal democracy can 
be seen when analysing the exemplar of the liberal democratic paradigm, the United 
States of America (US).  In the US, liberal democracy has allowed the economy to be 5 
 
primary. It is well-known that market-generated inequalities are high in the US (Swenson, 
2001: 3). This is based on classical assumptions that people are rational, and the market 
will  result  in  the  most  favourable  outcomes.  The  economy  represents  a  classical 
unleashing of productive forces, allowing capitalism to expand.  In America, there exists 
the idea that the economy needs to be protected from the political, so as to promote the 
activities  of  private  individuals  who  are  focused  on  the  pursuit  of  irregular  interests 
(Wulfric, 2010: 1). The political structure is merely seen as the best way of providing 
checks and balances. In contrast to social democracy, liberal democracy is not seen as the 
productive core of the economy. In America there are property rights and a high level of 
faith in the bourgeoisie. But labour and labour forming alliances are weak. As Lazare 
(1997: 32) explains, the US remains one of the few societies in the world, without a viable 
working-class political party of even the most anaemic kind. Whilst “no country claimed 
to value individual rights more highly than the US, few suppressed the collective rights of 
labour  more  vigorously”  (Lazare,  1997:  32).  America  is  an  “economically  polarized 
society marked by freedom for an increasingly narrow elite and growing unfreedom for 
those below” (Lazare, 1997: 35). According to Wulfric (2010: 1), liberal democracies are 
distinguished as a society “divided amongst itself”. Parliament is full of political parties 
that are buffeted and influenced by competing minority interests that never pull together 
in one direction. Political parties hardly represent the people but their donors, lobby 
groups and corporate backers. This is because, as Lazare (1997: 37) explains, the role and 
rights of the people is essential negative, i.e. “to guard the system against subversion or 
attack, but otherwise to stand aside and let it do its work” (Lazare, 1997: 31). Everyday 
life is de-politicized. The individual is expected more or less to rely on the state for 
liberty. The liberal state has instituted his/her „rights‟ and “citizenship is mainly a non 
participatory condition to be passively enjoyed” (Wulfric, 2010: 1). According to Rosa 
Luxemburg (in Geras, 1994: 97), “the people in a democracy should be the active source 
of change, instead of mere objects of it”. The people require a “high degree of political 
education, of class consciousness and organization” (Geras, 1994: 97).   
If  liberal  democracy  has  lead  to  the  deterioration  of  civil  liberties,  and  specifically 
positive  freedoms  that  would  stunt  the  development  process  and  the  provision  of 
economic  needs  that  extend  further  than  just  basic  needs  then  this  system  is  not 
appropriate for South Africa, and we can dismiss it on the grounds that it is flawed and 
an  undesirable  political  structure  that  will  not  allow  for  maximum  growth  and 
development in South Africa. This is essentially due to its inability to impart positive 
freedom on individuals, which would prevent a mass participatory movement based on 
compromise and coordination (that South Africa crucially needs) from coming about. 
After  accepting  the  importance  of  the  state  for  development,  and  subsequently 
dispelling liberal democracy, we return to our exploration of the models in the second 
category. The „developmental state‟ paradigm shall firstly be analysed. 
 
b. The developmental state: 
 
 According to the book “Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa,” edited 
by Edigheji (2010), the developmental state that is envisioned for South Africa is be 
centred  on  “its  ability  to  promote  economic  and  social  inclusion,  as  well  as  being 
underpinned by the principles of democratic governance”. In contrast to this vision, a key 
feature of the East Asian developmental state is the statist rightwing political regime that 6 
 
most  of  these  countries  have  assumed,  albeit  to  differing  degrees,  namely, 
authoritarianism. In the book, the authors discredit the argument that the developmental 
state  cannot  be  democratic,  i.e.  that  they  cannot  coexist.  They  therefore  borrow 
predominantly economic, as opposed to political aspects from the East Asian model for 
adoption to a democratic, South African model. Whilst their argument that development 
and  democracy  can  coexist  is  compelling,  I  disagree  that  the  developmental  state  and 
democracy can coexist, as one cannot separate the political and economic elements of the 
East Asian developmental state model. I suggest that the economic and political elements 
of this model exist only because of the existence of the other, i.e. the specific economic 
policies in East Asia, (such as high savings and high corporate debt/equity ratios) could 
only exist because of the authoritarian political structure (which, for example, suppresses 
consumption) and vice versa. If the economic policies are applied in isolation, or within 
another  political  structure, they  will  be  ineffective,  and  possibly  detrimental.  Huang‟s 
analysis suggests that on a purely economic basis, there is no reason why South Africa 
should  not  imitate  Korea.    However,  the  crucial  constraint  is  political.  “When  the 
requisite  institutional  characteristics,  such  as  policy  integration  and  bureaucratic 
competence, are absent, pursuing strongly developmental policies can make a country 
worse off than otherwise” (Huang, 2002, 563 in Fryer, 2009b: 20). Of course, I would 
suggest  that  there  are  purely  economic  constraints  too,  but  these  could  perhaps  be 
overcome  if  South  Africa  had  the  correct  political  and  institutional  framework.  Fine 
(2010) also suggests this idea that both the political and economic aspects cannot be seen 
separately. Fine (2010: 170) distinguishes the developmental state definitions found in the 
literature into what he calls the „political school‟ and the „economic school‟.  
The  „political school‟  has been  concerned  primarily with  whether  the  state  has  the 
capacity to be developmental (Fine, 2010: 170). It is concerned with the political and 
ideological concerns that make appropriate economic policies possible (Fine, 2010: 171). 
Authoritarianism is able to function in these countries due to the presence of a Weberian 
bureaucracy (Evans, 2010: 45). Members are recruited on a meritocratic basis, and are 
tasked with formulating industrial policy in the national interest. In this model, there is 
also a close relationship between the state and capital (a domestic private elite), otherwise 
known as „alliance capitalism‟ where labour is somewhat silenced. 
The „economic school‟ by contrast is preoccupied exclusively with correct economic 
policies  (Fine,  2010:  171).  Emphasis  is  on  market  imperfections  solved  by  state 
interventionism predominantly in trade and industrial policy. The state controls finance 
and investment allocations so that targeted firms can achieve economies of scale in fairly 
uncompetitive environments (Fine, 2010: 171). Wade and Veneroso (1997: 7) provide a 
succinct  „economic  school‟  definition:  “High  household  savings,  plus  high  corporate 
debt/equity ratios, plus bank-firm-state collaborations, plus national industrial strategy, 
plus  investment  incentives  conditional  on  international  competitiveness  equals  the 
„developmental state‟”. Other characteristics of the industrial strategy include a reliance 
on  export  markets,  import  substitution  industrialisation  and  massive  infrastructure  in 
heavy industry (Baek, 2005: 485). 
 It is evident that such a system and unique financial structure requires a large degree of 
co-ordination between banks, firms and the government. The government has to place 
restrictions on foreign borrowing by firms to keep tight control on capital mobility. Firms 
and banks who do not operate in accordance with the national industrial strategy do not 
receive  this  government  support  and  therefore  the  entire  system  is  disciplined. 7 
 
Institutional arrangements are fundamental. The institutional environment within which 
these  policies  exist  involves  a  high  degree  of  central  planning,  a  powerful  central 
government with a large bureaucracy, and corporatist control over society (Baek, 2005: 
487).  These  institutions  formulate  and  implement  policies  to  meet  their  greater 
developmental objectives. Of these institutional arrangements,  Chalmers Johnson, the 
first to „coin‟ the concept of the developmental state, identified “pilot agencies” that are 
“super-ministries” in industrial policy making, such as the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) in South Korea (Huang, 2005: 13). Through these organisations, the state “was 
central  to  the  provision  of  new  capital”  and  it  had  “authority  over  foreign  currency 
allocations” (Evans, 1995: 48 cited in Godongwana, 2007: 1). 
These definitions of the developmental state facilitate a comparison of South Africa‟s 
conditions with those needed for this model. On a purely economic basis, although the 
macroeconomic policies of this model are innovative, South Africa seems ill-equipped to 
implement such a system. The East Asian system of high levels of corporate debt would 
be extremely vulnerable to shocks if not for their government support and high level of 
coordination and implementation of CF 2 policies. It seems safe to assume that South 
Africa‟s government capacity is too weak to provide the sufficient level of support and 
disciplining processes required to protect large domestic firms from such potent shocks. 
This kind of financial structure also requires a tightening of capital controls. South Africa 
abolished its financial rand in 1995 and now relies heavily on short term, speculative 
foreign capital portfolio flows to compensate for a current account deficit (Theunissen, 
2010: 1). This system is already precarious, but if South  Africa were to cut back on 
foreign capital inflows, a balance of payments disaster would ensue. It is therefore hard to 
imagine, in light of South Africa‟s economic liberalisation policies, often indistinguishable 
from neo-liberal IMF stabilisation policies that the necessary restrictions on capital flows 
would be enforced (Fine, 2010: 175).  
On the political front, besides the theoretical flaws inherent in authoritarianism, which 
falls outside the scope of this paper, authoritarianism would simply not be allowed to 
work  in  South  Africa.  It  seems  far  –fetched  to  believe  that  authoritarianism  could 
function  in  light  of  the  current  democratic  political  structure  and  atmosphere  of 
„freedom‟ that the „new‟ South Africa offers. Also, considering that the ANC emphasises 
that “the people shall govern” (Fryer, 2009: 2) and prides itself as being one of the most 
progressive democracies in the world, it would be impossible, owing to the psychological 
sentiment of human rights in South Africa, to institute an authoritarian regime without a 
severe  backlash  from  reactionary  forces.  Moreover,  South  Africa  does  not  enjoy  a 
„platonic elite‟. The political culture of Japan and China for example, where bureaucrats 
are highly skilled and revered, contrasts dramatically with South Africa, where politicians 
and  civil  servants  are  not  trusted  or  held  accountable,  or  perhaps  even  sufficiently 
qualified and skilled for the job (Godongwana, 2007: 1). The political culture in Japan and 
China for example consists of a highly qualified bureaucracy, whereby members of the 
public service are held in high esteem (Evans, 2010: 45). In terms of industrial strategy in 
South Africa, Fine (2010: 175) says, “far from the (developmental) state coordinating or 
even  coercing  private  capital  to  commit  to  a  concerted  programme  of  industrial 
expansion and diversification, the interests of private capital have predominated over 
development goals”.  Fostering a purely exclusive relationship between business and the 
state in South Africa will in all likelihood simply lead to cronyism between political and 
business elites. The presence of workers‟ unions in South Africa would also make this 8 
 
kind of alliance capitalism highly contested in South Africa.  The nature of the South 
Africa labour market is an important element that suggests, as shall be shown, that social 
democracy is better suited as a model of comparison and should be considered in more 
detail. This shall be shown below. Whilst the economic policies that the developmental 
state  model  entails  are  innovative,  the  incompatible  political  nature  of  this  model 
immediately  trumps  any  potential  success  that  economic  policies  might  have  had. 
Therefore,  if  the  political  structure  at  the  heart  of  the  developmental  state  model  is 
relative authoritarianism, and the economic policies of the developmental state depend on 
this political structure, then we may deduce that the developmental state model can be 
ruled out as a developmental alternative for South Africa.  
3.  CONSIDERING SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
The rest of this paper takes a closer at social democracy, with relation to South Africa. At 
the  ANC  national  conference  in  Polokwane  in  2007,  the  ANC  recognised  that  their 
proposed  developmental  state  would  have  to  be  “undergirded  by  the  principles  of 
democratic government” (Edigheji, 2010: 2). The government would engage with private 
capital strategically whilst be “rooted amongst the people and buttressed by the mass-
based democratic movement” (Edigheji, 2010: 2). In light of this significant emphasis on 
democracy (and other reasons to follow), it is believed here that social democracy is in 
fact a more compatible model for comparison in South Africa than the developmental 
state. It is important to note, as mentioned, that social democracy is not being considered 
as a „one-size-fits-all‟ approach, but that it merely appears to be a better framework of 
comparison for South Africa due to its political compatibility and its theoretical strength. 
For  South  Africa  to  develop,  a  model  will  need  to  be  devised  according  to  specific 
domestic  conditions,  historical  legacies  and  institutional  obscurities  (Evans  2010  in 
Edegheji, 2010: 16).  The challenge associated with using other models for comparison 
and insight is to come up with a “thorough pragmatism that lies between understandings 
that are too specific and those that are too general” (Fryer, 2009b: 21). Building such a 
model will need to be a constantly reflexive, “open process of trial and error1” (Edegheji, 
2010: 16). Finally, as shall be shown, it will have to be “a process of a protracted struggle 
and negotiations between competing classes” (Edegheji, 2010: 18). 
This section will be laid out as follows. Firstly, with the aid of Platzeck et al. (2007: 1), 
the basic tenets of contemporary social democracy will be highlighted. The analysis then 
turns  to  the  socio-political  and  economic  conditions  in  South  Africa,  to  assess  its 
compatibility  with  social  democracy.  It  is  suggested  that  a  class  compromise  is  the 
essential ingredient needed for a social democratic based development strategy to work. 
However,  there  are  serious  challenges  that  may  thwart  the  possibility  of  a  class 
compromise and therefore the likelihood of such a compromise requires investigation. 
These  major  stumbling  blocks  are  identified,  followed  by  suggestions  or  possibilities 
regarding what needs to be done to overcome these stumbling blocks. 
                                                           
1 Geras (1994: 98) eloquently describes the similar ideas of Rosa Luxemburg, the famous Marxist 
and social democrat, into two characteristics  of this process, namely „interiority‟ and an „open 
horizon‟.  Social democracy was an „open horizon‟ for Luxemburg, i.e. the people can make of it 
whatever they want. They do this  through a self-formative process  of learning-by-doing, self-
education and self-criticism,  what Geras calls „interiority‟ (Geras, 1994: 98). Searching for a correct 
model will have to see this process as an open horizon characterized by „interiority‟. 9 
 
a. Tenets of social democracy 
 
As stressed, what is so strikingly different about liberal democracy as compared to social 
democracy is the suppression of politics. As Platzeck et al. (2007: 1) explain, the social 
democratic model acknowledges the “primacy of politics”, as superior to the “narrow-
gauge,  economic  thinking”  of  liberals  and  Marxists.  Social  democracy  replaces  this 
thinking with “the principles of reform, progress, compromise and a balance of interests 
beyond the boundaries of class” Platzeck et al. (2007: 1). Arrighi (2008: 41 cited in Evans, 
2010: 40) says that the barriers to pursuing developmental possibilities are “more political 
than economic”. The political foundation at the core of the social democratic model is 
naturally,  democracy.  Instead  of  complex  governments,  institutions  and  checks  and 
balances, the goal of democracy should be to overcome the incongruity between the 
government and the governed (Lazare, 1997: 37). One of the great theoreticians of social 
democracy, Eduard Bernstein famously said “democracy is a condition of socialism to a 
much greater degree than is usually assumed … it is not only the means but also the 
substance …” (Bernstein, 1899 in Fryer, 2009b: 25).  
A timeless common thread of social democracy is that it refutes laissez - faire liberal 
capitalism where there is an absence of regulation. Social democrats insist on playing 
direct and pragmatic roles in directing change (Platzeck et al., 2007: 1). Social democracy 
actively couples market dynamics with “social reform and social renewal, in order to 
systematically make growth and prosperity attainable to all layers of society” (Platzeck et 
al.,  2007:  1).  There  are  clear  Keynesian  undertones,  but  the  model  devised  by  the 
Stockholm School in Sweden was more constructive in that it did not just attempt to 
stabilise the business cycle and achieve full employment, it went further by using these 
methods to bring about positive development (Lundberg, 1985). In the Swedish model, 
the public sector is extensive and it involved an important alliance between the elected 
party and the centralised labour movement,  which is seen to protect the interests of 
workers (Sandbrook et al., 2007: 187 cited in Godongwana, 2007: 1). Swenson (2001: 10) 
shows  how  this  model  was  mutually  beneficial  to  all  parties  as  it  also  protected  the 
interests of employers too. For example, a high level of public social protection exempted 
companies  from  having  to  provide  employees  with  costly  welfare  benefits.  Swenson 
dispels the “equivalency premise” which states that all workers and all employees have 
equivalent agendas across the world, i.e. if you are an employer, you would not be in 
favour of a welfare state. However, in Sweden, employers felt to the contrary. This kind 
of compromise has positive effects on productivity (Swenson, 2001: 9). As this implies, 
the  social  democratic  model  stresses  compromise  and  high  levels  of  coordination,  i.e.  all 
policies  are  linked  together  such  as  those  regarding  health,  family,  the  economy, 
education and the labour market making it principally a “preventative state” that invests 
in  people  and  education  for  example (Platzeck  et  al.,  2007:  1).  Compromise  is a  key 
element  of  this  model,  as  shall  be  shown.  For  development,  discipline  and  an 
autonomous mechanism  to  minimize state  capture  by  powerful  particularistic  interest 
groups are needed. In the US and East Asia, this discipline is imposed by repressive 
measures, either through market forces, inflation targeting or repression of consumption. 





b. The socio-political and economic conditions of South Africa 
 
The next step in this study is to analyse the historical, socio-political and economic 
characteristics  of  South  Africa.  In  1994,  at  the  advent  of  the  ANC‟s  rise  to  power, 
conditions were in fact more conducive to social democracy than at present. For example, 
the tripartite alliance comprising the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was robust. Their ideas and 
policies  were  well  organized  in  the  form  of  the  RDP  that  was  published  in  1994. 
According to Hirsch (2005: 59), “[t]he document was a blueprint for a productive social 
democratic  haven”.  It  proposed  a  succession  of  pragmatic  solutions  and  targets. 
However, the ANC soon became influenced by the success and/or global demands of 
neo-liberalism and in 1996 GEAR was implemented, without the contribution of the 
other members of the Alliance (Southall and Webster, 2010:  142). GEAR policies include 
“fiscal conservatism, trade liberalisation, cost recovery in the provision of basic services, 
tax cuts for the rich, and privatisation” (Seekings, 2004: 299). It is unfortunate in a sense 
that the political transition coincided with the pinnacle of neoliberal popularity, as few 
other alternatives were considered and the development of a successful class compromise 
was halted. This begs the question as to whether the ANC is really opposed to social 
democracy or whether it was merely convinced that it was not viable at the time, which 
led to the ideological shift. Hirsch (2005) argues that the ANC had no choice but to shift 
from social democratic principles, but it is argued here that this was, to a greater extent, 
due to ideological pressure. The ANC did have a choice, and a more pragmatic solution, 
as described, was available to them The focus on neo-liberalism was followed by renewed 
interest in the East Asian model, with little attention given to the European model. There 
clearly  represents  a  gap  in  the  literature,  the  missing  element  of  which  this  research 
project endeavours to expose.  
Important  socio-political  aspects  relevant  to  the  next  few  sections  include:  the 
fragmented or informal tripartite alliance and South Africa‟s fragile democracy; South 
Africa‟s dualistic class structure, the South African labour market and its labour surplus; 
and  the  “paradoxical”  institutional  architecture  which  includes  arrangements  such  as 
NEDLAC. Socio-economic conditions include low economic growth, high inequality and 
unemployment, and problems of redistribution. Slabbert (1999 in Adler and Webster, 
2000: 1) says that the ANC‟s major political dilemma is how to achieve “democratic 
stability and vigorous market-driven growth” in a country with a “high degree of socio-
economic inequality”. It is argued that this is the dilemma for all sectors, including the 
government, trade unions, political parties and community organisations. According to 
Adler and Webster (2000: 3), not one of these sectors has been able to gain full consent 
for, or impose their development ideas on others. I argue that the failure of each of these 
sectors in this regard is a direct result of the fragmented policy arena in South Africa. 
Only what Erwin (2007: 1) calls a „cross class alliance’, or class compromise will bring about 
centralization and an end to fragmentation.  
At  the  moment,  the  tripartite  alliance  is  informal,  placing  democracy  in  jeopardy. 
According to Harcourt and Wood (2003: 82), “South Africa‟s economic trajectory is not 
simply the product of global anonymous forces; rather it reflects ongoing contestations 
between  capital  and  labour”.  Labour  is  subordinated  at  the  hands  of  the  state  and 
business (Southall and Webster, 2010: 142). Labour has  had some notable successes, 
including retaining and improving labour legislation, especially the 1995 Labour Relations 11 
 
Act, securing improved wages, and working conditions in sectors such as manufacturing 
(Harcourt and Wood, 2003: 82) and pressuring the ANC to deliver basic social services 
(Harcourt and Wood, 2003: 91). However, the labour movement is convenient to the 
government, which uses „talk‟ to legitimize the workers for electoral support. Labour is 
currently in a „catch twenty two‟. They hold little clout in a weak alliance, but it would be 
futile for them to exit the alliance as they would likely suffer an incapacitating split and 
descend  into  the  political  wilderness  (Adler  and  Webster,  2000:  3).  However,  no 
alternative exists. Labour and business also seem to be acting ideologically and out of 
„special interests‟, rather than pragmatically. The correct institutions are not in place for 
pragmatism to be exercised, in contrast to Sweden for example where these institutions 
exist. In South Africa, we have what Parsons (2007) calls, Industry Collective Bargaining, 
as opposed to a Centralised collective bargaining system such as Sweden. This ultimately 
leads to fragmentation and inefficiencies2.  
  
c. A class compromise 
 
Adler and Webster constructively explain how a class compromise can move all sectors 
out of Slabbert‟s predicament. This positive-sum strategy entails opposing GEAR with 
the  aim  of  reaching  a  negotiated  compromise.  Adler  and  Webster‟s  (2000:  3)  class 
compromise involves three elements: “"regulated flexibility" in which labour and business 
negotiate variations in employment standards; social citizenship yielding basic income 
security; and increased corporate taxes to finance social security.” The specifics of their 
idea will be explained shortly. Such a class compromise is in step with Erwin‟s (2007: 1) 
argument that a cross class alliance is the only factor capable of bringing about a „National 
Democratic Revolution‟ in South Africa that will be able to positively transcend to the 
economic sphere. The work of Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1993: 83) reveals 
that  the  “level  of  economic  development  is  causally  related  to  the  development  of 
political democracy”. The decisive connecting factor according to Huber et al. (1993: 83) 
is the development of the class structure.  
However, not all theorists believe in the conclusive theoretical superiority of a class 
compromise.  Przeworski  (1985)  explains  how  social  democracy‟s  compromise  with 
capitalism is forever an impediment on social democracy‟s success. He explains that social 
democrats continually find themselves in a contradictory situation. They strive for a more 
just distribution of incomes and property, but before they have anything to distribute, 
they need to produce (and therefore cooperate with capitalists) (Przeworski, 1985: 41). 
According to Preworski (1985: 41), “[h]aving strengthened the market, social democrats 
perpetuate the need to mitigate the distributional effect of its operation”. Seekings (2004: 
                                                           
2 A case in point is the education sector in South Africa. Seekings (2004: 305) illustrates how 
teachers unions (especially the South Africa Democratic Trade Union) coerced the government 
into agreements that have had “real benefits to teachers but a range of direct and indirect costs to 
the quality of education”.  Substantive increases in funds have been allocated for poor schools, but 
most of this has all gone to teacher‟s salaries and not to improving quality (Seekings, 2004: 308). 
At the time of  writing, Seekings (2004: 308)  said that teacher‟s salaries absorbed 90% of the 
education budget.  
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300) describes this fundamental compromise as the process whereby the “working class 
conceded its demand for the socialisation of the means of production in return for the 
capitalist class accepting a high level of redistribution through the budget”. According to 
Przeworski (1985: 42), “[g]eneral affluence can be increased if capitalists are made to 
cooperate and wage-earners are continually disciplined to wait” (Przeworski, 1985: 42). 
Przeworski‟s argument may be critiqued on two grounds. Firstly, he sees increasing the 
productivity  of  capital  as  a  diametrically  opposed  endeavour  to  increasing  welfare. 
However, as mentioned by Platzeck et al. (2007: 1) social democracy is a “preventative 
state”. My argument presented here is that by increasing the productive power of human 
capital  though  improvements  in  health  care,  education  and  training  etc,  you  are 
simultaneously increasing welfare. The more skilled the workforce, the less the state will 
have  to  provide  in  terms  of  benefits.  Estevez-Abe,  Iversen  and  Soskice  (2001:  145) 
present  a  concurrent  argument  and  states  that  “social  protection  aids  the  market  by 
helping economic actors overcome market failures in skill formation”. Their research 
seriously challenges the popular notion that social protection is simply “inefficient forms 
of  labor  market  „rigidities‟...  Social  protection  can  provide  important  competitive 
advantages” (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001: 176).  
 Secondly, Przeworski sees class compromise as a consequence of social democracy. 
However, it is viewed in this research paper as having an essence of its own that is 
desirable. The connotation of the word „compromise‟ seems to imply a less than optimal 
strategy as it implies some kind of sacrifice. Here, the nature of a compromise has a 
positive connotation in that the compromise itself will bring about the most optimal 
solution. The social democrats that he described could be more likened to „Keynesian 
liberal democrats‟ as opposed to social democrats who possess an essence of their own. 
We return briefly to the specifics of Adler and Webster‟s class compromise. Regulated 
flexibility entails more flexible employment standards to provide business the incentive to 
enter into the compromise by being able to „hire and fire‟ more easily. It also provides the 
incentive to invest more in workers as “inflexibility may encourage employers to choose 
labour-saving technology, to subcontract work, or to employ undocumented workers” 
(Adler and Webster, 2000: 3). However, business will need to compromise in the form of 
higher  corporate  taxes.  The  incentive  to  do  so  is  that  these  taxes  will  allow  the 
government to increase unemployment protection for workers, taking this responsibility 
off  the  hands  of  firms.  Workers  will  be  more  obliging  to  this  flexibility  when  their 
concessions  can  be  offset  by  public  benefits.  Firms  will  help  to  fund  the  state‟s 
“redistributive and productivist welfare policies” (the social citizenship element). Regulated 
flexibility refers to the stipulation of the terms of concessions (that must be determined in 
negotiations)  through  the  current  industrial  relations  institutions  (Adler  and  Webster, 
2000: 3). This compromise will simultaneously address “many of the conditions necessary 
for improving productivity alongside a modest redistributive mechanism for the poor and 
unemployed and some compensation for those workers who have made wage and labour 
standards concessions” (Adler and Webster, 2000: 3).  
d. Stumbling blocks 
Establishing what needs to be done, is very different to actual implementation. In South 
Africa‟s  case,  there  are  many  stumbling  blocks  which  may  hinder  this  kind  of 
compromise from coming about. In terms of Adler and Webster‟s class compromise, 13 
 
they feel that “the parties do not perceive that the benefits of compromising outweigh the 
costs of standing fast” (Adler and Webster, 2000: 3). The state may lack the capacity and 
resources to execute the ambitious role as outlined above. Labour may lack the capacity 
to use the institutions it helped create effectively. In the community sector, the plurality 
of  competing  interests  and  its  relatively  embryonic  organizations  are  problematic. 
Business associations are “not encompassing”, and tend to be unable to discipline their 
members (Adler and Webster, 2000: 3).  
Other stumbling blocks identified in the research process are as follows. The first is 
ideological: the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of neo-liberalism have squeezed 
social  democracy  ideologically.  It  represents  a  fear  of  socialisation,  i.e.  that  social 
democracy is a slippery slope to socialism. Even though the theoretical and economic 
model of social democracy itself is efficient, it seems to be at the mercy of other social 
and ideological factors that are ultimately suppressing it. Perhaps after the recent financial 
crisis, those involved in the development debate should seize this moment. Secondly, a 
priori it makes sense that resistance to the system stems from the fact that it is „in the 
middle‟. It is not reducible to simplistic features, like for example, the state or market or 
left or right. It represents Przeworski‟s weak notion of „compromise‟.  Thirdly, this paper 
has advocated state autonomy as a necessary prerequisite for development. However, 
Fryer (2009b: 20) explains that caution should be exercised in the case of developing 
countries. According to Fryer (2009b: 20) state autonomy can be risky for developing 
countries because of the “extreme danger of the state being captured by narrower elites”. 
Again,  a  strong,  democratic,  cooperative  institutional  framework  will  be  needed  to 
prevent this, but with this comes institutional challenges as shall be explained below. 
Another  argument  against  autonomous  models  such  as  social  democracy  is  that 
globalisation is deleterious to the national options that social democratic governments 
have available to them (Platzeck et al., 2007: 1). I argue that the opposite is true. Esping-
Andersen (2002 in Fryer, 2009b: 19) in fact shows that ironically, it is the liberal system 
that  globalization  has  undermined,  not  the  Swedish  model  and  other  alternatives  to 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism. In the US and UK, “employment structures have hollowed out 
and welfare regimes withered away” (Esping-Anderson, 2002 in Fryer, 2009b: 19). The 
so-called „globalisation thesis‟ involving increased openness of trade, claims to be the 
cause of a „race to the bottom‟ in wages and welfare regimes. This thesis is undermined as 
many models of countries such as Sweden and Germany have kept the essential factors 
the same. In Sweden, this is in large part due to the social democratic idea of “social 
protection as a productive factor” (Hemerijck, 2002: 17 in Fryer, 2009: 19). Wade and 
Veneroso (1997: 12) illustrate that when the East Asian countries opened up their capital 
markets as suggested by the IMF, their system became vulnerable and collapsed in the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Adler and Webster (2001: 3) also feel that their model 
of compromise rests on the need for international conditions to be conducive to such a 
settlement.  However,  they  feel  that  “economists  are  increasingly  calling  for  some 
regulation  over  the  perverse  forms  of  financial  instability  generated  by  globalization” 
(Adler and Webster, 2000: 3). 
Another stumbling block is the high level of corruption in both the public and private 
domains. According to Edigheji (2010: 4), South Africa ranked 55th out of 180 countries 
in Transparency International‟s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. This ties in with 
South Africa‟s lack of a competent „platonic elite‟. Again, if a deep compromise was in 
place,  parties  would  hold  each  other  accountable,  thereby  theoretically  reducing 14 
 
corruption. Other social parties would have a greater say in policy and decision making in 
turn requiring greater transparency and less self-interest. 
In terms of institutional arrangements, Adler and Webster (2000: 3) feel that South 
Africa‟s  scope  of  institutions  in  fact  suits  their  vision  of  a  class  compromise.  South 
Africa‟s range of institutions include the National Economic, Development and Labour 
Advisory Council (NEDLAC), a corporatist institution created for the discussion of a 
range  of  public  policies;  “industry-based  bargaining  councils  and  accords,  workplace 
agreements  between  business  and  unions,  and  local  and  regional  development  pacts 
forged in fora that include interests beyond business and labour” (Adler and Webster, 
2000:  3).  However,  whilst  the  range  of  institutions  provides  a  potentially  successful 
institutional framework for a class compromise, the reality suggests that South Africa‟s 
institutional  performance  and  disjoint  is  more  of  a  stumbling  block.  For  example, 
NEDLAC‟s  job  was  to  “reach  consensus  between  government,  business,  labour  and 
community interests on economic and social policy issues before they were debated in 
parliament”  (Southall  and  Webster,  2010:  141).  However,  NEDLAC‟s  role  is  purely 
consultative  in  the  forming  of  major  policy.  As  a  result,  GEAR  was  declared  “non-
negotiable” (Fryer and Newham, 2000: 7). It highlights the disjuncture between “labour 
and other policy spheres” (Fryer and Newman, 2000: 7). Its deflated capacity does not 
bode well for South Africa‟s chances of fostering compromise and coordination between 
all  sectors  and  classes  in  society.  Also,  as  mentioned,  the  industry  specific  collective 
bargaining system in South Africa is causing inefficiencies. Whilst these institutions are 
present and have the potential to support a corporatist class compromise, a problem lies 
in the fact that that these institutions exist paradoxically alongside and are subordinated 
by  another  set  of  institutions  which  have  incongruent  aims.  Mkandawire  (2010  in 
Edigheji, 2010: 17) argues that there were other institutional reforms that took place in 
the 1990s that accompanied the policy and intellectual shifts that were mentioned. These 
institutions include “independent central banks, stock markets, property rights, public-
private  partnership  and  the  whole  public  sector  reform  agenda  underpinned  by  the 
paradigm  of  „new  public  management‟  promoted  by  the  international  financial 
institutions”  (Mkandawire, 2010  in  Edigheji,  2010:  17).  Whilst  these  institutions have 
been  essential  to  the  sophistication  of  South  Africa‟s  financial  sector  and  have  had 
successes,  they  have  not  lead  to  maximum  development  in  part  because  they  were 
“disembedded and were not context specific”, i.e. they were not structured in accordance 
with a greater development strategy (Mkandawire, 2010 in Edigheji, 2010: 17). Their aims 
are  also  inconsistent  to  NEDLAC.  Instead  of  fostering  cooperation,  they  foster 
repression, in line with GEAR‟s agenda, i.e. to limit expenditures according to the budget, 
“reduce the budget deficit, stabilize the exchange rate, tighten monetary policy to curb 
inflation,  privatize  state  assets,  relax  foreign  exchange  controls,  and  reduce  and 
homogenize tariffs”. This is done to “facilitate growth by provided a stable economic 
environment to encourage private sector investment” (Harcourt and Wood, 2003: 79). As 
a  result  we  have  what  Mkandawire  (2010  in  Edigheji,  2010:  17)  calls  an  “anaemic 
regulatory state” designed merely for restraining social actors. What South Africa needs is 
a  deep  seated  compromise  facilitated  by  a  well-functioning  institutional  arrangement. 
“The  lack  of  vision  is  reflected  in  the  disjuncture  of  actual  policy:  macroeconomic 
policies have embraced the mould of neo-liberalism, while labour law has been quasi-
corporatist.  There  is  a  sense  that  these  two  policies  were  constructed  in  glorious 
isolation” (Fryer and Newham, 2000: 4).  15 
 
Lastly, democracy is messy, and the concerned parties seem unwilling to get their hands 
dirty. A compromise involves pleasing many different people with different agendas. An 
ideal  compromise  that  solves  what  Traxler  (2003)  calls,  “horizontal”  and  “vertical” 
problems, is very difficult to implement. It is almost easier to be relatively authoritarian in 
order to get things done instead of having to consult with all parties on every level. As 
reiterated  by  Wood  and  Harcourt  (2003:  79)  “Indisputably,  the  currency  of  neo-
corporatism is that of messy compromise.” 
e. Future possibilities 
 
Firstly,  South  Africa  needs  to  break  the  mould  as  the  East  Asian  countries  did  by 
designing a broader developmental policy specifically for South Africa. As expressed by 
Fryer and Newham (2000: 4), the deep-seated problem is that South Africa has “never 
really had a vision of development and is bewildered as to exactly what to do” (Fryer and 
Newham, 2000: 4). This is partly due to the fragmented policy arena where there are 
competing aims and strategies. That is why a class compromise basic on principles of 
democratic governance, would be a viable way out of this predicament.  It is at this 
juncture that the social democratic model enters as a useful model of comparison. It 
illustrates  the  need  to  get  the  “political  side  right”  by  measures  of  cooperation, 
pragmatism and compromise. The only way that South Africa can pursue a coherent and 
collective development strategy is if it entrenches the interests of all parties. Of course 
these interests will be based on the interests of others, i.e. a Nash equilibrium at the 
national level so to speak. This will ultimately be an optimal way forward. Policy makers 
need to take advantage of the current ideological sea-change, so as to reinforce the idea 
that social protection can bring about, not hinder increased productivity. This links to a 
useful paper by Evans (2010), in his which he devises a 21st century „developmental state. 
He emphasises the need to build a model based on improving people‟s capabilities, i.e. 
“the capabilities approach” as pioneered by Amartya Sen (Evans, 2010: 41). Evans (2010: 
41) advocates that South Africa‟s new development strategy be centred on the service 
sector. Human capital is a large untapped resource in South Africa. Improved well-being 
is dependent on the service sector becoming a source of new well-paying jobs that reflect 
the level of real productivity of workers. “The centrality of services creates a new set of 
challenges for the developmental state, forcing the state to focus on people and their 
skills instead of machines and their owners” (Evans, 2010: 42). This is exactly in line with 
the objectives of the 21st century „preventative‟ social democratic state as advocated by 
(Platzeck et al., 2007: 1). The „preventative‟ state essentially invests in human capabilities. 
The primary focus of this model should not be the welfare state. There does need to be 
some state support, but dependence on social state benefits is not considered the primary 
aim of social democratic policy (Platzeck et al., 2007: 1). Rather, an investment focussed 
social  state  pursues  a  policy  of  creating  decent  and  equal  opportunities  for  all,  thus 
ensuring they can lead their lives independently. There also needs to be an increased 
awareness in the new direction of research in comparative political economy that places 
the firms at the centre of the analysis, i.e. it explains what social policy means to the firm. 
These arguments are fleshed out by inter alia, Swenson (2002), and Estevez-Abe et al. 
(2002). Contrary to popular belief, Swenson (2002: 9) illustrates how the whole social 
democratic ideal in Sweden was orchestrated largely by employers‟ interests. Business has 
powerful  clout  in  South  Africa.  A  realisation  of  this  argument  by  business  could 16 
 
fundamentally  enhance  the  possibility  of  business  „buying  in‟  and  bringing  about  a 
compromise between the state, labour and business.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to enhance the developmental debate in South Africa. This was done 
by exploring the developmental state as pioneered by the East Asian „tigers‟ and the social 
democratic model that came about in Europe and specifically Scandinavia after World 
War II. These two models are framed within a broader economic and political debate 
concerning competing visions for development and governance, namely the neo-liberal or 
liberal democratic model based on neoclassical orthodoxy, and models which advocate a 
primary role of the state, such as social democracy and the developmental state. The 
developmental state was discussed due to its prevalence in the current  South African 
development  debate.  After  conducting  a  literature  review  on  the  theoretical 
underpinnings  and  historical  success  of  each  of  these  models,  this  research  paper 
dismissed the East Asian template of the developmental state due to its incompatible 
political (and therefore economic) arrangements. Although the authoritarian nature of the 
„developmental state‟ is unworkable in South Africa, this model highlights the importance 
of  state  autonomy.  This  was  proved  by  considering  the  opposite  case,  the  liberal 
democratic  model.   It  is  argued  here that  liberal  democracy  may  be  dismissed  as  an 
optimal  model  of  comparison  for  South  Africa  on  account  of  its  inability  to  impart 
positive freedom on individuals, which would prevent a mass participatory movement 
based  on  compromise  and  coordination  form  coming  about.  The  failures  that  have 
resulted from allowing the economy and markets to reign supreme highlight the “primacy 
of politics”, a cornerstone of social democracy.  As democracy forms the other branch of 
state autonomy, social democracy seemed a more compatible, useful and theoretically 
stronger  model  for  analysis  and  comparison.  After  examining  the  tenets  of  social 
democracy, followed by an analysis of South Africa‟s socio-political and socio-economic, 
it was established that an essential ingredient to opening up possibilities to South Africa‟s 
developmental success was a class compromise. It is argued that South Africa‟s economic 
trajectory  is  in  large  part  due  to  class  conflicts  that  exist  within  a  fragmented  and 
uncompromising policy arena, as opposed to other arguments which, for example, blame 
globalisation. An example of a useful compromise was provided by Adler and Webster 
(2000: 3): “In this compromise workers gain jobs, social security and a voice in decision-
making. Business gains a more productive workforce and flexibility conducive to job 
creation, while committing itself to longer-term productive investment. The state achieves 
economic growth, increased tax revenues, and stability”. However, such a compromise 
faces severe ideological, socio-political, economic and institutional stumbling blocks that 
make  such  a  compromise  difficult  to  envisage.  Further  research  is  required  into  the 
possibility of a class compromise and the specific stumbling blocks in South Africa, but 
this paper argues that two factors could make this a possibility. If a compromise could be 
devised based on the interests of all parties, then it seems a reasonable possibility. The 
difficulty is making the parties realise the benefits of such a compromise. This is where 
the second factor comes in: an autonomous state. The dominant party position of the 
ANC might be beneficial here as it allows them enough leeway for the state to kick start 
this process. The ANC too needs to realise that it will benefit immensely from such a 
compromise.  A  „preventative  state‟  which  improves the  capabilities  of  its  people  will 17 
 
improve livelihoods and South Africa‟s economic performance. This will do wonders for 
the ANC‟s track record. Increased pressure on the state is also required from all sectors, 
especially  business.  Ultimately,  a  bold  move  is  required,  and  the  changing  global 
environment seems a good time for the ANC to revert back to its pragmatic visions pre-
GEAR. It is therefore concluded that social democracy is a useful model for comparison. 
It  crucially  alerts  us  to  the  “primacy  of  politics”  and  that  economists  need  to  take 
cognisance of the socio-political context in which their policies are formed, or else the 
futility of economic policies will prevail. Therefore, although it should not be seen as a 
panacea,  or  a  one-size-fits-all  template,  it  is  recommended  that  the  pragmatic  social 
democratic model inform the development debate in South Africa to a greater extent, as 
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